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INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WORKER
RIGHTS AND THE EFFICACY OF THE
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES:
A GUATEMALAN CASE STUDY

Amy E. Belanger"

INTRODUCTION
On the morning of August 24, 1994, the anti-riot division of the

Guatemalan National Police, in conjunction with private security forces,
executed a savage raid on the plantation workers of the Empresa Exacta
finca, at the Hacienda San Juan del Horizonte in western Guatemala.'
More than 500 police2 broke through the main gate of the finca with a
bulldozer and fired tear gas and live bullets at the workers.' The Guatemalan National Police killed three workers and critically wounded a
fourth worker.4 Additionally, eleven workers required hospitalization,

* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Washington College of Law, American University. The
author would like to thank Lance Compa and Professor Mark Hager for their assistance and support. To my family, Caroline George, Mark Pihlstrom, and John Truong,
thanks for keeping the sanity, smiles, and sentences flowing.
1. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala For Violations of the American
Convention on Human Rights and Other International Instruments at 2, In re Laborers
of La Hacienda San Juan del Horizonte: de la Empresa Exacta, S.A., et al., Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (No. 11, 273) (1994) [hereinafter Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala];
Wflliam Clark Harrell et al., Request for Precautionary Measures and For a HearingBefore the Commission in Plenary (Sept. 9, 1994) at 2 (petition submitted to the
InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights) (on file with American University Jour.
nal of International Law and Policy).
2. See Guatemalan Peasant Occupation Turns Violent, REutERS, August 25,
1994 (reporting that more than 500 police opened fire on men, women, and children).
The Guatemalan National Police stated that they did not have any information on the
incident. Id.
3. See Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting
an official statement of the Bishops of Quetzaltenango, describing the incident).
4. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 2. Diego
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many of whom were shot in the back while attempting to flee.5 While
these horrendous state-sanctioned murders may be characterized as "the
most overtly violent repression of workers in years,"6 such violence and
other forms of repression are rampant in Guatemala.7 The plight of the
workers at the Empresa Exacta finca parallels the situation of many
other laborers in Guatemala today.'
The workers of Empresa Exacta occupied the land in response to the
inaction of the judicial system in enforcing their constitutionally and
statutorily mandated rights.9 Prior to the violent eviction, the workers
embarked on an organizing campaign to compel their employer to recognize the minimum wage"0 and to comply with other legally mandated

Orozco Garcia, a leader of the workers, was one of the three workers killed by the
Guatemalan National Police. Id. The National Police transported Garcia via helicopter
to a nearby army base. Id. Garcia's body was found 50 kilometers from the finca,
with clear signs of torture. Id. It is presumed that his body was thrown from the
helicopter but it is not clear whether he was alive at that time. See Five Labor Activists Killed on Guatemalan Plantations, U.SJGuAT. LAB. EDUC. CAMPAIGN, Nov. 1994,
at 3 (reporting that Diego Orozco Garcia was "apparently dropped to his death" from
the helicopter that brought him to the army base).
A second incident of violence directed toward the occupying workers of the
Empresa Exacta finca occurred several weeks later. On September 15, 1994, three
men handed documents with unknown contents to Juan Jose Garcia Gonzalez, a participant in the occupation, and escorted him out of the village of Chiquirines, located
near the Hacienda San Juan del Horizonte. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 6. The following day, 20-year-old Gonzalez was found with a
fatal gun shot wound in his spine. Id. A statement by the Archbishop's office affirmed that "the killing was a consequence of the occupation of finca San Juan del
Horizonte". Id.
5. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 2. The police
also detained 40 workers, who have been released on the condition that they do not
return to the finca, and with the requirement that they report to the prosecutor's office every week. Id.
6. Five Labor Activists Killed on Guatemalan Plantations, supra note 4, at 3.
7. See infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text (discussing the repression of
the labor movement in Guatemala as a function of the government's export-led economic strategy).
8. See Trish O'Kane, Guatemalans Still Under the Boss' Heel, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at A8 (citing the Empresa Exacta incident and noting similar conflicts
at over 40 other fincas where companies refuse to pay the minimum wage); Petition
Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 5 n.7 (reporting that over 400
similar complaints filed in 1994 remain unresolved by the judiciary).
9. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 4.
10.

U.SJGuATEMALAN LABOR EDUCATION PROJECT, LABOR AND WORKER RIGHTs

BULLETIN ON GUATEMALA 2 (Sept. 5, 1994) (on file with The American University
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labor provisions." After the workers sought judicial enforcement of
their rights, 2 the company illegally fired sixty-two workers.' 3 The
workers immediately notified the court, seeking reinstatement within
tweity-four hours, as mandated by the Labor Code of 1992.' The judiciary did not respond and effectively denied any form of legal recourse
for the aggrieved workers.'5 The impotence of the courts prompted the
workers to resort to self-help, and on July 17, 1994, the workers collectively occupied the f'mca.' 6
In contrast to its handling of the workers' complaints, the court in
Coatepeque responded immediately when the general manager of the
Empresa Exacta f'mca initiated legal proceedings against the occupying
workers by ordering their eviction by the police in the violent manner

Journal of International Law and Policy) [hereinafter U.SJGLEP BULLTIN]. Although
the legal minimum wage is 10 quetzales per day, less than 52.00, the workers received only six quetzales a day, or approximately SI.00. Id.
11. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 4. The workers
sought compliance with the following statutory provisions: 1) payment of the legally
required minimum wage and legally required bonus; 2) recognition of the right to
have one day of rest per week; 3) respecting legally required vacation time; 4) access
to the state health care system; and 5) respect for the right to organize and bargain
collectively in a union. Id.
12. U.SJGLEP BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 2. On February 18, 1994, the court
issued an emplaziemento, or injunction, against the company, which prohibits the
company from firing workers without court approval. Id.
13. U.SJGLEP BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 2; see Petition Against the Republic
6f Guatemala, supra note 1, at 4-5 (discussing the illegal dismissal of 62 workers).
The company began to fire the workers on March 2, 1994, without obtaining the
required court authorization. U.SJGLEP BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 2.
14. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 4-5.
15. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1,at 4-5. The case
remained unaddressed for two months until June 15, 1994, when the Labor Court of
Coatepeque notified the workers that the case was transferred to the Sixth Court of
Labor and Social Welfare in Guatemala City. Id While the Government of Guatemala
cites the establishment of this new labor court as an advancement in the recognition
of worker rights, this court is not easily accessible to the rural population. Id. To
date, the case remains unprocessed. Interview with William Clark Harrell, Attorney,
Centro para la Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos, Guatemala, Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 17, 1995).
16. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 5. The workers
attempted to negotiate with the owners to reach an equitable solution. U.SJGLEP
BuLLETI, supra note 10, at 2. Despite pressure from the Ministry of Labor, the
Procurador de Derechos Humanos, and the Procurador General de la Nacion, the company refused to negotiate. Id.
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described above. 7 Guatemalan President Ramiro de Leon Carpio defended the military action, proclaiming, "I am sorry about the loss of
life, and about the wounded, but the anti-riot troops acted legally and
we will continue to act this way in the future, even though it causes
pain in my heart . . . The right to private property is protected in the

Constitution."' 8
The Empresa Exacta incident is the basis for extending the "continuing review" of Guatemala's status as a beneficiary under the United
States' Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. 9 The GSP
is a unilateral trade instrument which provides that the products of developing countries that respect worker rights will be granted duty-free
access into United States markets." The GSP program officially expired
on July 31, 1995.21 The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade favorably reported a bill introduced by Congressman Philip M.
Crane (R-IL) to reauthorize the GSP program. 2
As a unilateral trade instrument, the United States GSP program can
be utilized to achieve social harmonization through the imposition of
trade sanctions. Although a multilateral forum for addressing and en-

17. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 5.
18. Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note 1, at 3.
19. O'Kane, supra note 8, at A8. On the October 1, 1994 deadline for the decision to maintain or revoke Guatemala's status as a beneficiary developing country
under the GSP program, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Mickey
Kantor, postponed the decision indefinitely due to the incident at the Empresa Exacta
finca. Id.
Congressman George Brown wrote to Mickey Kantor, expressing concern: "[t]he
Empresa Exacta incident, which was initially defended by President Ramiro de Leon
Carpio until a public outcry persuaded him to reverse course, appears to provide an
unfortunate illustration that the Guatemalan government and business community have
not yet developed a commitment to respect [for] worker rights." Letter from George
E. Brown, Member of Congress, to Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Sept. 8, 1994) (on file with The American University Journal of International
Law and Policy).
20. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988); see infra notes 43-58 (discussing the United
States GSP history and evolution incorporating worker rights conditionality).
21. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 601, 108 Stat.
4809, 4990 (1994) (renewing GSP retroactively until July 31, 1995); Notice, 59 Fed.
Reg. 65,547 (1994) (announcing the decision to extend the GSP program until July
31, 1995).
22. H.R. 1654, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House Bill does not amend
the existing statutory provisions regarding internationally recognized worker rights. Id.
23. See GSP Renewal and Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 3625, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) [hereinafter GSP Renewal Bill] (proposing substantive modifications to
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forcing labor rights abuses may be more desirable in that it is more
consistent with the transnationalization of the global economy, no effecfive international enforcement mechanism has been established yet.!"
The World Trade Organization (WTO) presents a feasible multilateral
forum wherein international standards could be formulated and non-compliance could be countered with trade sanctions. The multilateral trade
negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which yielded the new WTO, however, did not generate international
consensus on linking a trade instrument to labor rights.' Thus, despite

the GSP program designed to improve beneficiary countries' compliance with internationally recognized worker rights); 140 CONG. REC. E1458-01, E1459 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown) (advocating that the proposed amendments of the GSP Renewal
Bill to strengthen protection of worker rights would encourage sustainable economic
and social development).
24. See Harlan Mandel, In Pursuit of the Missing Link. International Worker
Rights and International Trade?, 27 CoLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 448-49 (1989)
(discussing the advantages of achieving a multilateral consensus on international labor
standards over a unilaterally dictated instrument). Many commentators suggest that

unilateral trade measures are inherently biased and protectionist, and are much less
effective than the product of multilateral negotiations. See Kriansak Kittichaisaree,
Using Trade Sanctions and Subsidies to Achieve Environmental Objectives in the
Pacific Rim, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 296, 299 (1993) (noting that unilateral trade measures involve a "stick," in the form of economic sanctions, and a
"carrot," in the form of trade preferences extended under GSP); JAMES M.
ZImmRmAN, EXTRATER~rrORIAL EPiPLOYMENT STANDARDS OF THE UNrTED STATES:
THE REGULATION OF THE OVERSEAS WORKPLACE (1992) [hereinafter Zi.MAN,
ExTRATrroRuAL EmPLOYMTxr STANDARDS] (arguing that the negative implications

of unilateralism include the possible violation of the sovereignty of other countries
and that the unilateral designation of "internationally recognized worker rights" is
unreasonable and lacking in international consensus). In the context of OPIC,
Zimmerman argues that the United States should not summarily condemn other countries for failing to establish and maintain internationally recognized worker rights.
James M. Zimmerman, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Worker
Rights: The Loss of Role Models for Employment Standards in the Foreign
Workplace, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 603 (1991) [hereinafter
Zimmerman, OPIC and Worker Rights].
25.

GOTE HANSSON, SOCIAL CLAUSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN EcoNOM-

ic ANALYSIS OF LABOUR STANDARDS IN TRADE PoucY 22 (1983). The Havana Charter to the International Trade Organization (ITO), founded in 1948, included a labor
rights clause. Id.; Havana Charterfor an International Trade Organization and Final
Act and Related Documents, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, art. 7,
ch. 2, U.N. Doc. ICLTO/1/4 (1948). The refusal of the United States to ratify the Havana Charter dissolved the impetus of the ITO, and thus facilitated its failure. See
also Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation

and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 93-96 (1990) (discussing
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efforts of the United States, the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations did

not yield a consensus on labor rights violations. 6
Consequently, the International Labour Organization (ILO)' remains
the only worldwide multilateral forum" where the recognition of worker rights can be pursued.29 While the ILO is instrumental in establishing international standards and defiming labor rights,"0 it does not pos-

attempts of the United States to introduce a working party on labor rights in the
GATT institutional framework).
26. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(14) (1988). The United States incorporated labor rights as
a negotiating objective in the Uruguay Round in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Id. The primary negotiating objectives with respect to worker rights
include: 1) promoting respect for worker rights; 2) reviewing the relationship of worker rights to the objectives and articles of GATr with the purpose of securing the
benefits of free trade to all workers; and 3) to adopt as a GATT principle that a
country cannot gain a competitive advantage through the denial of worker rights. Id.
Currently, the United States is the primary proponent of creating a GATF working
party to investigate labor rights violations. Resistance to this effort resulted in the
lack of a labor rights clause in the WTO.
But see James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 806-12 (1994) (discussing the resistance of the United
States to unconditional ratification of multilateral human rights commitments embodied
in various United Nations human rights conventions and conventions of the Organization of American States (OAS)). Smith outlines the "illusory nature" of the recent
ratification, combined with extensive reservations, by the United States of three International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions: the Genocide Convention; the Torture Convention; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. at
824-33.

27.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., BACKGROUNDER 'R

1 (Sept. 1991). The

ILO, first established in 1919, is a section of the United Nations that promulgates
conventions and recommendations which embody international labor standards. Id. The
ILO, recognizing that progress in economic productivity is not commensurate with
progress in social harmonization, adheres to the philosophy that "development is not a
purely economic concept but that its purpose is fundamentally social and human in
character and that economic development cannot automatically ensure social progress."
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVEN-

TIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8 (1976).

28. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165 (1993) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of possible forums for labor rights advocates to seek vindication of worker
rights internationally and domestically).
29. Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the ILO: Redefining
the Role, 11 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 55-56 (1989). Although ILO Recommendations are
non-binding instruments, ILO Conventions are binding on those members who have
ratified that particular Convention. Id. at 57-59.
30. See Michelle E. Gorden, Comment, Haitian Forced Labor in the Dominican
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sess the remedial power to impose sanctions.3 Although the use of
"minilateral" or regional free trade agreements is an increasingly utilized
phenomenon,32 the Side Agreement on Labor 3 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does not establish enforceable international standards by which to measure or redress labor rights abuses.'
Hence, the GSP program remains a viable alternative to ameliorating the
prevalent labor abuses in developing countries.
This Note will examine the worker rights provisions embodied in the
United States GSP program. Part II discusses the origin of the GSP in
the United States and the incorporation of labor rights as a prerequisite
LAB. LJ.206, 238 (1994) (describing the role of the 1no in the
creation of international standards of labor rights and development policies).

Republic, 15 COMIP.

31. Lee Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International
Labour Organization, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 99, 102

(Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992). The ILO has a comprehensive supervisory mechanism which monitors member countries' compliance with the various Conventions. Id.
According to Zimmerman, "the ILO is the only organization devoted to employment
issues that has both the experience and the institutional framework by which to regulate international labor practices." ZImERMAN, EXTRATERRIToRIAL EMPLOymrr
STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 179. Compa notes that the leverage of the 1LO "is
limited to exhortation and censure." Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and
Instruments of Recourse For Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 152 (1992).

Furthermore, Theresa Amato claims that
[tihe United States prefers GAIT to the ILO because GAIT may afford a
method of sanctioning through trade that the ILO cannot provide; however, the
United States' choice of GATT leads critics to view this choice of forum as a
mechanism more apt to stress the economic rather than humanitarian aspects of
linking worker rights to trade.
Amato, supra note 25, at 121.
32. See C.A. Primo Braga & Alexander J. Yeats, Minilateral and Managed Trade
in the Post-UruguayRound World, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 245 (1994) (discussing the dissatisfaction with and deficiencies of multilateral trade negotiations and
the impetus toward negotiating "minilateral" trade arrangements to achieve trade liberalization in regional trade blocs). Experience under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) labor side agreement has proved unsatisfactory. See Lance
Compa, International Labor Rights and The Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 133-35 (1993)

(critiquing the NAFTA labor side agreement and its failure to establish binding international labor standards).
33. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, art. 2, 32 L.M. 1499, (containing the finalized agreement of the NAFTA parties on labor).
34. See Compa, supra note 32, at 133-35 (critiquing the NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement and its preservation of sovereignty in establishing labor standards).
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for obtaining beneficiary status for developing countries. Part IlI examines the enforcement structure of the GSP program, analyzing the review
procedure and the substantial barriers erected that prevent enforcement
of the GSP program in conformance with the purported congressional
intent. Part IV discusses Guatemala's experience under the review process of the GSP and analyzes the effectiveness of the probationary "continuing review" procedure. Part V proposes necessary substantive and
administrative changes that should be adopted in the future
reauthorization of the GSP program.
I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE GSP

A. ORIGIN OF THE GSP
In the United States, the GSP program grants preferential duty-free
tariff treatment to specifically designated "beneficiary developing countries."" The concept of GSP originated in 1964 at the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), during which time
developing countries expressed a desire to reduce their dependency on
foreign aid and stimulate their economies by increasing exports and
generating foreign exchange." The unilateral extension of trade concessions to lesser developed countries37 is consonant with GATT under the
"Special and Differential" approach designed to augment the economic
growth of developing nations.
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988). Statutory authority for the United States GSP
program is set forth in Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the GSP
Renewal Act of 1984. Id. The United States became the 19th developed market economy to implement a GSP program in 1976. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, GIST: GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 1 (Dept of State Dispatch, Sept. 2, 1991).
36. See GSP RENEWAL AcT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4910, 5101 (discussing the development of
the concept of GSP); Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International
Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 354 (1994) (discussing the adoption of GSP
by GATT members in 1971).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. The House Ways and Means
Committee describes the original 'purpose of the GSP program:
As initially conceived, GSP systems were to be: (1) temporary, unilateral grants
of preferences by developed countries to developing countries; (2) designed to
extend benefits to sectors of developing countries which were not competitive
internationally; and (3) designed to include safeguard mechanisms to protect
domestic industries sensitive to import competition from articles receiving preferential tariff treatment.
Id.
38. See Kele Onyejekwe, GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17
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B. EVOLUTION OF THE GSP PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Initial Enactment in the 1974 Trade Act
The GSP program, as originally authorized by Title V of the 1974
Trade Act, provided developing countries "fair and reasonable access"
into the United States market for certain eligible products." In addition
to product eligibility criteria,' the statute delineated threshold requirements that must be met in order for a country to qualify for beneficiary
status41 The statutory scheme of the 1974 Act is tailored to allow only
those countries that demonstrate economic need to achieve and maintain
beneficiary status.4

HAMUNE L. REV. 77, 95 (1993) (noting that the term "Special and Differential" derives from the 1973 Tokyo Round Declaration, and in practice means that developing
countries are allowed to protect their domestic markets more than developed
countries). GATr first implemented the GSP in June 1971, by waiving the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) Principle for 10 years. Id.; Waivers: Generalized System of
Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, 18 GENERAL AGREEMNTS ON TARRffs AND
TRADE, BASIc INSTRUmENTs & SELECrED DOcu ENrs 24 (1972) [hereinafter BISD].
In 1979, GATr permanently established the GSP as a preferential treatment scheme
for developing countries that does not contravene the MFN Principle. Differential and
More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 Nov. 1979, 26 BISDY 203 (1980).
39. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2066 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 24612466 (1980)).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (1980).
41. Id. § 2462(b)(1)-(6). In its original enactment, the GSP statute prevented the
President from designating a developing country a beneficiary under GSP if the country- 1) is a Communist country; 2) is a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries; 3) adversely affects United States commerce by affording preferential treatment to the products of another developed country, 4) has nationalized,
expropriated, or seized ownership of property of United States citizens; 5) does not
cooperate with the United States in controlling international narcotics trafficking; or 6)
did not act in good faith in enforcing or recognizing arbitral awards rendered in favor
of United States citizens. Id. Amendments in 1976 imposed the additional requirement
that the President could not designate a country as a beneficiary under GSP if that
country aids or abets international terrorists. Id. § 2462(b)(7).
42. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. The GSP program, as envisioned
by GATT members and the United States, is designed to serve as an interim program
to boost the economic competitiveness and global integration of developing countries.
Id. The United States GSP program incorporates the principles of "graduation" and
"competitive needs limitations"; countries and products can be "graduated" from the
GSP program pursuant to section 2464, which provides that "[t]he President may
withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of the duty-free treatment .

. . ."

19

U.S.C. § 2464 (1980). In addition, the "competitive need limit" provision automati-
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The original GSP statute proved unsatisfactory, as it became apparent
that the benefits of the GSP program flowed directly to "narrow privileged elites" in a small portion of the newly industrialized countries.43
Evidence accumulated demonstrating that the duty-free treatment of
imports into the United States provided a powerful incentive for United
States industries to relocate to beneficiary developing countries in order
to minimize production costs." The absence of fundamental worker
rights in developing countries strengthened the inducement to relocate.4'
The United States' Congress proactively implemented various pieces of
"social dumping"
legislation to combat against the developing

cally suspends a product's eligibility under GSP for a particular country if that product is deemed "competitive." Id. § 2464(c). The President is required to consider, in
his decision to suspend or limit GSP benefits according to principles of graduation or
competitive need limits, among other factors, "whether or not such country has taken
or is taking steps to afford workers in that country (including any designated zone in
that country) internationally recognized worker rights." Id. §§ 2464(a)(1), 2462(c)(7).
As a protectionist measure, section 2463(c) lists statutorily-excluded import-sensitive
items. Id. § 2463(c). According to the General Accounting Office (GAO),
"[rlestrictions on GSP benefits have been enacted due to the need to balance benefits
provided to BDCs [beneficiary developing countries] with concerns over the impact on
domestic interests." UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES PROGRAM 50
(1994) [hereinafter GAO ASSESSMENT].
43. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. See Brown, supra note 36, at
352 (reporting that in 1987, 60 percent of the benefits of GSP flowed to the "Four
Tigers" of Asia: Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. With the globalization of markets,
labor costs became critical in calculating maximum profitability for United States
industries. See Karl A. Hofstetter & Richard A. Klubeck, Accommodating Labor and
Community Interests in Mass Dismissals: A Transnatiofial Approach, 9 INDUST. REL.
L.J. 451, 474-75 (1987) (discussing the repercussions in the United States and abroad
of capital "hypermobility," plant relocations, and the use of such tactics to gain concessions from American workers).
45. H.R. REP. No, 1090, supra note 36, at 11. The theory of comparative advantage provides the primary rationale for the international division of labor whereby
developed countries participate in the more capital-intensive stages of production and
developing countries provide the labor-intensive assembly. KURT PETERSEN, THE
MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 6 (1992). This exchange of resources is
facilitated by the respective governments. See Susanna Peters, Comment, Mexican Labor Law From Three Perspectives: The Constitution, The Trade Unions, and The
Maquiladoras: Labor Law For the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between Workers' Rights
and Foreign Investment, 11 COMN. LAB. L. 226, 228 (1989) (discussing Mexico's
liberal trade policy, as evidenced by "incentive packages" that encourage foreign investment in manufacturing for export).
46. Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive
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countries' policy of exploiting labor as a comparative advantage in
trade.' 7 The rationales behind these initiatives range from a genuine

Unilateralism?", 15 Hui. RTs. Q. 1, 2 n.2 (1993). Philip Alston defines "social
dumping" as "the practice of relying upon low 'social' costs . . . to produce goods
that can then be sold in another market at a price which is well below the cost of
production in that market, primarily because producers in that market would not be
permitted to tolerate such low social standards." Id. But see Amato, supra note 25, at
83 n.21 (noting that the term "social dumping" legislation is actually a misnomer in
that the goods are more costly, not in terms of market price in the foreign market,
but in terms of the price of the exploitation borne by the workers).
47. See Amato, supra note 25, at 82-83 (documenting the "social dumping" legislation enacted in response to the flux of capital movement to countries that deny
basic worker rights).
The Caribbean Basic Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) grants duty free status
to exports from the Caribbean Basin on a more extensive basis than under the GSP.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1988). The CBERA is the first legislation to incorporate labor
rights conditionality, originally requiring the President, when determining beneficiary
status, to consider "the degree to which workers in such country are afforded reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively."
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 212(c)(8), 97 Stat.
384, 387 (1983). The GSP provides duty free treatment to developing countries that
meet eligibility criteria, including respect for "internationally recognized worker rights."
19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988). The Customs and Trade Act of 1990 amended the
CBERA so that the labor rights provision comported with the GSP standards. Customs
and Trade Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c)(8) (West Supp. 1991).
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) program provides insurance
for overseas investments to countries that meet certain eligibility standards. 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2191-2200 (1988). In 1985, Congress incorporated "internationally recognized worker rights" criterion as an eligibility requirement. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-204, § 5, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (1985)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2191(a) (1988)). CBERA and OPIC do not have their own
mechanisms for review, rather, the determinations of the GSP Subcommittee are
adopted.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is an international development organization that insures investments in host countries against political risks
and provides technical assistance to countries desiring to encourage foreign investment.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985,
art. II, 24 LL.M. 1605, reprinted in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, MULTILATERAL INVESTMNT GUARANTEE AGENCY AND FOREIGN INvEs NT 356 (1988). In the United
States, the MIGA Act requires that countries receiving investment guarantees adhere to
internationally recognized worker rights. 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k-2 to 290k-3 (1988).
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, allows the imposition of retaliatory economic sanctions
on any country trading with the United States that engages in unfair trade practices,
defined to include worker rights violations. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
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concern for oppressed workers abroad to protection of United States
domestic industries.'
2. The GSP Renewal Act of 1984
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, which reauthorized the GSP, addressed the trade perversion experienced under the original act and introduced protectionist mechanisms which further restricted the availability
of GSP trade benefits to potential developing countries.49 Amendments
to the GSP program limited preferential access to the United States
market according to the principle that "trade, rather than aid"50 2 will
enable developing countries to compete in the global economy through

48. See

LAWYERS

COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.

38 (1992) (discussing the dichotomy of economic and moral justifications for labor rights conditionality). While moral rationales invoke the improvement
of worker rights in countries that do not maintain worker rights as a justification for
conditionality, the economic rationale "seeks to reverse 'social dumping,' the economic
advantage obtained by countries utilizing cheap labor to lower their production costs."
Id.
See GAO ASsESsMENT, supra note 42, at 97 (outlining the opposing positions
in the controversy over worker rights conditionality in the GSP). Beneficiary developing countries regard the conditions as penalties, particularly because other GSP
programs have not incorporated workers rights conditionality. Id. at 100. Beneficiaries
under GSP resent this new conditionality in a trade instrument created under the
auspices of nonreciprocity and designed to promote developing countries' economic
competitiveness. Id. Worker rights advocates contend that conditionality is necessary in
order to achieve parallel development in the social and political spheres, so that sustainable economic growth can be realized. Id. at 101.
49. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988); see infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text
(discussing labor rights conditionality in the GSP statute).
50. Statement of Purpose for GSP Renewal Act, Pub. L. 98-573, § 501(b), 98
Stat. 3019 (1984). The first four purposes set forth by the GSP Renewal Act of 1984
are as follows:
(1) promote the development of developing countries, which often need temporary preferential advantages to compete effectively with industrialized countries;
(2) promote the notion that trade, rather than aid, is a more effective and costefficient way of promoting broad-based sustained economic development;
(3) take advantage of the fact that developing countries provide the fastest
growing markets for US exports and that foreign exchange earnings from trade
with such countries through the GSP can further stimulate US exports;
(4) allow for the consideration of the fact that there are significant differences
among developing countries with respect to their general development and international competitiveness.
FOREIGN POLICY
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export expansion.'

The magnitude of the world debt crisis influenced

the protectionist stance adopted by the United States in its trade policy. 2 Accordingly, the GSP Renewal Act incorporates several provisions
that curtail the availability of the GSP benefits to countries that demonstrate advanced economic competitiveness.'
C. LABOR RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY
Cushioning itself in trade liberalization rhetoric, the new GSP program
presented new obstacles for potential beneficiary countries to hurdle.
The most contentious impediment to beneficiary status is the labor rights
clause5 The reauthorization of the GSP program added stricter eligibility criteria for beneficiary developing countries, stipulating that a benefi-

ciary country respect "internationally recognized workers' rights."' 6 The

51. Id.
52. See EDWARD J. RAY, U.S. PROTECTIONISM AND THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS
146 (1989) (noting that the debt crisis did not exist during the original enactment of
the GSP in 1974).
53. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing statutory limitations
exempting countries that achieve certain levels of economic competitiveness from
beneficiary status).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988). A per capita gross national product (GNP) limit
excludes countries from beneficiary status if the GNP exceeds the statutory ceiling of
$5,000. ld. § 2464(c)(3)(D)(ii)(I).
55. Id. § 2462(b)(7). The most controversial addition is the eligibility requirement
that countries must respect worker rights. Id; see GAO AssEsshMENT, supra note 42,
at 100 (reporting that there is more resistance to the labor rights provision than to
the intellectual property provision). An intellectual property provision requires that the
President, in determining whether to confer beneficiary status, "shall take into account.., the extent to which such country is providing adequate and effective
means under its laws for foreign nationals to secure, to exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights."
19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5) (1988). The United States GAO suggests that the intellectual
property provision provokes less contention because the link between trade policy and
commercial policy is directly quantifiable, whereas the link between trade policy and
labor rights is harder to measure. GAO ASSESsMNTT,
supra note 42 at 101.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(7) (1988). The reauthorization of the GSP in 1984 incorporated a worker rights provision as a specific criterion in the designation of a
beneficiary developing country: "[t]he President shall not designate any country a
beneficiary developing country . . . if such country has not taken or is not taking
steps to afford internationally recognized workers' rights to workers in the country
(including any designated zone in that country)." Id.
With respect to the withdrawal or suspension of beneficiary status, "[tihe President shall . . . withdraw or suspend the designation of any country as a beneficiary
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United States Congress employs the term "internationally recognized
worker rights" to signify and establish the following five essential labor
rights: 1) freedom of association; 2) the right to organize and bargain
collectively; 3) prohibitions on the use of forced or compulsory labor; 4)
a minimum age for employment; and 5) acceptable conditions of work,
including minimum wages and hours, and occupational safety and
health. 7 The first three of these "internationally recognized worker
rights" are fundamental human rights defined by the ILO." The fourth
and fifth rights, while not considered fundamental human rights by the
ILO, are supported by various ILO Conventions.59

developing country if, after such designation, he determines that as the result of
changed circumstances such country would be barred from designation as a beneficiary developing country .... " Id. § 2464(b). Despite the mandatory language, the
failure to enforce worker rights "shall not prevent the designation of any country as a
beneficiary developing country under this section if the President determines that such
designation will be in the national economic interest of the United States." Id. §
2462(b)(7). This escape clause effectively converts the worker rights provision into a
discretionary exercise.
The worker rights provision of section 301, embodied in the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, contains stricter language, providing that a country
is in compliance if "the foreign country has taken, or is taking, actions that demonstrate a significant and tangible overall advancement in providing throughout the foreign country [internationally recognized worker rights]." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(c)(1)
(1988).
57. Id. § 2462(a)(4).
58. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to
Organise (Convention No. 87), entered into force July 4, 1950, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOM-

1919-1981, at 4 (1982) [hereinafter ILO CONVENTIONS]; Convention
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain
Collectively (Convention No. 98), entered into force July 18, 1950, reprinted in ILO
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 7; The Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour
(Convention No. 29) entered into force May 1, 1932, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS,
supra, at 29; Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (Convention No.
105) entered into force Jan. 17, 1959, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS, supra, at 39;
See Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the ILO: Redefining the
Role, 11 COMP. LAB. LJ. 48, 79-80 (1989) (discussing the implementation of LO
labor standards by the United States GSP program). Ironically, the United States has
not ratified either Convention 87 on the freedom of association or Convention 98 on
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with employers. Schlossberg, supra,
at 77. The only ILO Convention ratified by the United States that addresses fundamental human rights defined by the ILO is the convention concerning forced labor.
Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (Convention No. 105), entered
into force Jan. 17, 1959, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS, supra, at 618.
59. Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working
MENDATIONS:
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The United States Congress thus determined that a country should not
reap the benefits of this preferential trade program by exploiting la-

bor.' When a developing country is allowed to abuse its workforce,
the benefits under GSP accrue to the business community at the direct
expense of suppressed workers. Theories of comparative advantage in

free trade falter when confronted with the egregious oppression of labor
as an exploitable resource. Therefore, the rationale is that developing

countries should not be allowed to exploit labor as a comparative advantage. 1
1. Lack of International Consensus
Even though "internationally recognized worker rights" are derived
from ILO Conventions, the GSP statutory language does not provide any
guidance as to how the five delineated rights are to be interpreted and
which body of international jurisprudence is to be applied when evaluat-

ing a country's compliance with the labor rights mandate.' AdditionalEnvironment (Convention No. 155) entered into force Aug. 11, 1983, reprinted in
ILO CONVENTIONS, supra note 58, at 350; Convention Concerning Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment (Convention No. 138), entered into force June 19, 1976,
reprinted in ILO CONVEMONS, supra note 58, at 730; Convention Concerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special Reference to Developing Countries (Convention No.
138), entered into force Apr. 29, 1972, reprinted in ILO CONvENTiONS, supra note
58, at 230; Convention Concerning Veekly Rest in Commerce and Offices (Convention No. 106), entered into force Mar. 4, 1959, reprinted in ILO CoNvENTIONS, supra
note 58, at 304; Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings (Convention No. 14), entered into force June 19, 1923, reprinted in
ILO CONVENTIONS, supra note 58, at 301.
60. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. The House Ways and Means
Committee, in adopting the labor rights conditions into GSP, stated that:
[Piromoting respect for the internationally recognized rights of workers is an
important means for ensuring that the broadest sectors of the population benefit
from the GSP program .... The denial of internationally recognized workers'
rights in developing countries tends to perpetuate poverty, to limit the benefits
of economic development and growth to narrow privileged elites, and to sow
the seeds of social instability and political rebellion.
Id
61. See Michael S. Barr et al., Labor and Environmental Rights in the Proposed
Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 HOus. J. INT'L L. 1, 27-28 (1991)
(discussing worker rights provisions as a countervailing measure against a developing
countries' exploitation of its workforce to induce foreign investment).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(4) (1988). Vhile the rights embodied in the GSP statute
derive from ILO Conventions, the President is not required to refer to standards
adopted by the ILO in furtherance of these rights. Id; see Alston, supra note 46, at 7
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ly, the United States is viewed as imposing unilaterally developed standards that lack international consensus and legitimacy.63 Critically, the

list of "internationally recognized worker rights" does not include the
principle of non-discrimination.'
Furthermore, the GSP statute fails to differentiate between the relative
weights accorded to the five worker rights.65 Thus, it is unclear whether all five rights are absolute rights that may not be abrogated by any
country.' Whether these rights are mere standards that can fluctuate
relative to a country's particular level of development is an additional

area of contention.'
(stating that the GSP statute "carefully eschews any reference to the ILO standards
per se"). For example, the GSP Subcommittee refuses to recognize human rights
violations against unionists as a violation of worker rights. See infra note 101 and
accompanying text (discussing the GSP Subcommittee's practice of dismissing allegations of violence against Guatemalan union leaders as human rights violations). This
distinction is in direct contravention of the ILO's standards regarding the freedom of
association. See Alston, supra note 46, at 12 (noting that the GSP Subcommittee
adopts a narrower interpretation of the freedom of association than the ILO in distinguishing between human rights and labor rights). Furthermore, the GSP statute does
not require referral to any "international" standards in evaluating the respect or denial
of the five "internationally recognized worker rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2462(4) (1988).
63. See Alston, supra note 46, at 11-12 (discussing the lack of international
consensus in the interpretation of the "internationally recognized worker rights");
Amato, supra note 25, at 121-22 (discussing the possible implications of the United
States unilateral definition of "internationally recognized worker rights").
64. See Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 173, 177 (1992) (noting that there
is a conspicuous absence of the fundamental right to equal opportunity and treatment);
Compa, supra note 28, at 164 (critiquing the lack of non-discrimination as an internationally recognized worker right); Alston, supra note 46, at 7 (stating that the list of
workers' rights is artificially restricted in that it does not include the principle of
non-discrimination, which is necessary to combat not only gender and race discrimination, but also oppression on the basis of ethnicity or political beliefs); see also
GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 3 (1993) (proposing the inclusion of non-discrimination as a right recognized under the GSP); H.R. 5136, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(4) (1988).
66. See Travis, supra note 64, at 178-79 (discussing whether these rights are
deemed absolute or relative); Compa, supra note 28, at 165 (distinguishing between
unconditional rights, which include the right of association and freedom from forced
labor, and rights that are dependent upon a country's level of development, which
include minimum wages, hours, and standards of employment).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 36, at 11. The legislative history of the
GSP Renewal Act of 1984 suggests that a country's level of economic and social
development should be taken into account when evaluating the labor situation. Id. The
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2. "Taking Steps" Standard
The standard of adherence to internationally recognized worker rights
is whether the beneficiary country is "taking steps" to afford these fundamental worker rights, rather than full compliance.' While "steps"
may be difficult to quantify in definitive terms, neither the GSP statute 9 nor the Regulations of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) 0 provide any guidance as to what actions constitute "taking
steps" toward the recognition of labor rights. Elaboration on this standard may be found in the legislative history to the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) Amendment Act of 1985.7: The OPIC
Amendment Act limits extension of insurance and financing to private
investors in countries that are "taking steps to adopt and implement laws
that extend internationally recognized worker rights ... to workers in
that country . ... ,n An explanation of what may constitute "intemationally recognized worker rights" is set forth in the House Foreign
Affairs Committee Report, which specifies that a country should be
found in compliance if that country: 1) is a member of 1LO and a signatory to the ILO Constitution; 2) has laws conforming to one or more
of the delineated worker rights; 3) and demonstrates continued progress
in implementing the worker rights.'

Committee on Ways and Means recognized that developing countries should not be
judged according to the labor standards prevailing in the developed countries. Id.
Furthermore, the Committee noted "that acceptable minimum standards may vary from

country to country." Id.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988).

69. Id
70. Regulations of the USTR Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Countries

for the Generalized System of Preferences Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0 to 2007.7
(1995).
71. Pub. L. No. 99-204, 99 Stat. 1670 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191
(West Supp. 1988)).

72. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1988). "Internationally recognized worker rights" are
defined by reference to GSP Renewal Act. Id.
73. H.R. REP. No. 285, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2572, 2577.
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II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE LABOR RIGHTS MANDATE
A. STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVIEW PROCESS
Although the President has the ultimate authority to enforce the GSP
program, 4 the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee
(TPSC)75 administers the program.76 The GSP renewal statute provides
three types of reviews. First, the President is required to conduct a
General Review "[n]ot later than January 4, 1987, and periodically
thereafter" of both eligible articles and beneficiary countries.' To date,
the President has conducted only one General Review.78 Second, pursuant to the acceptance of requests submitted by interested parties, the
GSP Subcommittee conducts Annual Reviews to ascertain the eligibility
of countries and products.79 Third, the President may revoke unilaterally

74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988).
75.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 2. The Trade

Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) consists of members of the Departments of State,
Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative
(USTR). Id. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 first established the Office of the
USTR as the "Special Representative for Trade Negotiations." Trade Expansion Act of
1962, § 241, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (1962). The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 broadened and codified the duties of the USTR. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988)).
76. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(a)(2) (1995).
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(a)(A) (1988).
78. Memorandum of January 2, 1987: Actions Concerning the Generalized System
of Preferences, 52 Fed. Reg. 389 (1987). The GSP Subcommittee conducted the first
General Review during 1985 and 1986. Id.
79. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988). The GSP statute does not provide any guidance on how the review process is to be administered. Id. The USTR Regulations,
promulgated pursuant to the GSP statute, specifies the technical details of the petition
and review process. 15 C.F.R. §§ 2007-2007.8 (1995). The Annual Review process, as
defined by the USTR Regulations, is the mechanism for reviewing the addition or
deletion of products and countries pursuant to requests for review which are submitted
by independent parties. Id. §§ 2007(a), 2007(b). The USTR Regulations detail the
timetable for submission of requests for review, hearings, and final decisions of the
Annual Review process. Id. § 2007.3.
The GSP Subcommittee has the discretion to accept or deny petitions to review
the worker rights situation in the challenged country. PETER DORMAN, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, WORKER RIGHTS AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF WORKER RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY

UNDER THE

GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 5 (1989). This policy effectively shifts the
burden on to the petitioner to establish a prima facie case for review. Id.
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the beneficiary status of any country that fails to recognize worker
rights.&°
If a petition is accepted for review, the GSP Subcommittee conducts
an investigation8 to determine whether a beneficiary developing
country's labor rights violations are sufficiently egregious to warrant

revocation of GSP status.' Yet, while a country is under review, its
status as a beneficiary under GSP remains intact. At the expiration of

the review period, the USTR may elect to either extend the review,
resulting in a probationary "continuing review;"" withdraw the country
as a beneficiary under GSP because of pervasive and unaddressed labor

rights violations; or terminate review status, determining that the country
is in compliance with the mandates of GSP, and thus its status as a

beneficiary is no longer in jeopardy. The common practice of extending
the review of a country which is not deemed to be in compliance with

the mandates of the labor rights provision is neither intended by Congress nor contemplated by the GSP statute or the USTR Regulations."

80. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(a) (1988). The USTR Regulations also allow for the TPSC
to initiate a review. 15 C.F.R. § 2007(0 (1995). This discretionary authority has never
been exercised by the President or the TPSC.
81. See FAY LYLE, BUREAu OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR, WORKER RIGHTS IN U.S. PoucY 9 (1991) (noting that petitions which are
accepted for review are considered along with the United States Department of State's
annual Human Rights Reports, reports from United States embassies, and ILO findings).
82. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(0 (1995). According to the USTR Regulations, the GSP
Subcommittee conducts the first level of review and reports to the TPSC. Id. The
TPSC considers the results of the GSP Subcommittee's review and conducts further
review if necessary. Id.§ 2007.2(g). The TPSC then prepares recommendations to the
President, which are first submitted to the USTR. Id. The USTR, after reviewing the
findings of the TPSC and the Trade Policy Committee CTPC). makes the ultimate recommendations to the President on any action to be taken. Id.
83. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1995); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988). The probationary
continuing review period, adopted in practice by the GSP Subcommittee, has no basis
in the GSP Renewal Act or the USTR Regulations. Id; see Amato, supra note 25, at
117-18 (discussing the USTR's justification for extending the review of worker rights

in Chile).
84.

15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1995); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988).
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B. LIMITATIONS ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF THE REVIEW PROCESS
1. "Substantial New Information" Standard
The USTR Regulations permit "any person" to "file a request to have
the GSP status of any eligible beneficiary developing country reviewed
with respect to any of the designation criteria."85 Many labor rights
advocates utilize the GSP petition and review process as a mechanism
for redressing worker rights violations internationally.86 Even though the
TPSC has the authority to initiate a review on its own motion," the
TPSC has not exercised this discretion.
While the USTR Regulations provide for broad standing to petition
the GSP Subcommittee," several limitations serve to diffuse the
availability of the review process. The USTR Regulations require that if
the GSP Subcommittee previously considered a petition to review worker rights in a specific country, a new petition must present "substantial
new information" in order to be reconsidered.89 This standard applies
whether the GSP Subcommittee accepted a previous petition for review
and found the country under investigation to be in compliance, or rejected the petition for not demonstrating a labor rights violation under
GSP. ° In cases where a beneficiary country's promises for improvement pursuant to previous review periods remain unfulfilled, this policy
forecloses further review of worker rights violations. Thus, labor rights
violations from previous years remain unaddressed, and the beneficiary
developing country's status remains securely intact, despite such intentional and negligent evasion.9 According to the GSP Director, as of
late 1994, the "new information" standard is being interpreted more

85. 15 C.F.R. § 2007(b) (1995).
86. See Compa, supra note 28, at 175 (explaining that labor rights advocates utilize the GSP as a forum for redressing the exploitation of workers abroad).
87. 15 C.F.R. § 2007(f) (1995).
88. 15 C.F.R. § 2007(b) (1995).
89. 15 C.F.R. § 2007(b) (1995). For a request for review of product or country
eligibility, the Regulations provide that "[i]f the subject matter of the request has
been reviewed pursuant to a previous request, the request must include substantial
new information warranting further consideration of the issue." Id. Requests for modifications in the list of eligible articles considered previously "must include either new
information which indicates changed circumstances or a rebuttal of the factors supporting the denial of the previous request". 15 C.F.R. § 2007.1(a)(4) (1995).
90. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 101.
91. Id. at 10, 110.
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broadly so that a country's nonfulfillment of past promises may consti-

tute "new information."
2. Denial of Judicial Review

Furthermore, while "any person" may petition the GSP Subcommittee
to investigate labor rights violations, both labor rights and human rights
advocates are denied standing to seek judicial enforcement of the worker

rights provision of the GSP program.93 In 1990, twenty-three labor and
human rights activists filed suit in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia against the President of the United States and
other government officials alleging failure to enforce the GSP labor

rights provisions according to congressional intent." Both the District
Court and the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the case on various jurisdictional grounds, thereby avoiding a

determination based on the merits of the case." More importantly,
however, is that the Circuit Court ruled that the labor groups and the

human rights groups lacked standing to pursue an action challenging the
administration of the GSP statute.' Circuit Judge David Sentelle found

that the human rights groups did not meet the first threshold of standing
or the personal injury requirement.Y The court states, in contrast, that

the labor organizations do meet the first criterion of standing in their
allegations of injury.9' The court concludes that the causal connection,
92. Id. at 111. The GAO proposes that the new information standard should be
amended to clarify that evidence demonstrating a lack of promised improvements is
new information for purposes of submitting a petition. Id. The GAO notes that "[t]he
concept of making progress to meet international standards is at the heart of GSP
country practice provisions; it is especially critical for worker rights, given the 'taking
steps' language in the statute." Id. at 125.
93. International Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
490 (D.D.C. 1990), affd per curiam, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also
Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding
that the President's determinations under the GSP program are not subject to judicial

review).
94. Bush, 752 F. Supp. at 490.
95. Bush, 954 F.2d at 746. Judge Karen Henderson ruled that the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id. Judge David
Sentelle found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action. Id. at 748.
96. Id. at 748 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
97. International Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
490 (D.D.C. 1990), affd per curiam, 954 F.2d 745, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Sentelle,
J., concurring).
98. Bush, 954 F.2d at 750 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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however, between the alleged injury and the granting of beneficiary
trade status under GSP is "at best a tenuous one." Chief Judge Abner
Mikva, in his dissent, concedes that while the human rights groups lack
standing, the labor rights groups do have standing, and further argues
that Congress specifically addresses the connection between trade benefits and injury in the GSP statute.' °0
3. Tactics Foreclosing Review
Other less transparent standards and devices employed by the GSP
Subcommittee in its review procedure serve to weaken the mandatory
language of the GSP statute. One such device is the policy of dismissing allegations of abuse and violence directed at labor leaders and
unionists by characterizing the allegations as human rights violations,
and therefore beyond the realm of GSP protection.'0 ' This policy creates a dichotomous inequity by assuming that labor rights violations are
not human rights violations. Secondly, the GSP Subcommittee repeatedly
rebuts information in petitions with reports from United States embassies, rendering the petition a complaint that can be summarily dismissed
for failure to state a claim, without investigating the veracity of the
allegations."°

99. Id.
100. Id. at 756 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting). Mikva concludes that the policy behind
the labor rights clause is to remove incentives for United States firms to relocate or
to extract unfair concessions from workers in the Unites States. Id.
101. See GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 109 (stating that the GSP Subcommittee classifies the murder of a trade union activist as a human rights violation
rather than a workers rights violation, and therefore is outside the purview of GSP);
DORMAN, supra note 79, at 7 (reporting that the GSP Subcommittee will not classify
the murder of a union member as a labor rights violation unless the violence resulted
from a specified range of labor activities); see also Petition/Request For Review of
the GSP Status of Guatemala Under GSP Worker Rights Provisions 3 (June 2, 1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Petition] (on file with The American University of International
Journal of Law and Policy) (explaining that the GSP Subcommittee consistently rejected allegations of violence toward unionists on the grounds that violence is endemic in Guatemala and there was no causal link between the violence and the victim's
union activity).
102. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES SUBCOMM. OF THE TRADE POLICY STAFF COMM., 1990 GSP ANNUAL REviEw 6-7 [hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL REvmw] (illustrating the GSP Subcommittee's policy of rebutting petitioners' allegations
with information provided by embassy reports).
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Ell. THE GUATEMALAN LABOR CRISIS:
BATTLING AGAINST IMPUNITY
A. A PARADIGM OF REPRESSION

In the decade following the Second World War, the labor movement

in Guatemala prospered'

and workers secured protective legislation

establishing a minimum wage and social insurance.'"

The military

coup in 1954, sponsored by the United States Central Intelligence
Agency,10 5 signified the demise of the organized labor movement and
effectively curtailed any further hope for protection of the labor

force."°e For the past forty years, the military and military-controlled
civilian governments of Guatemala suppressed the organized labor movement"° as the wealthy elite reasserted power." Repression of the
103. See JAMES HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEviL: HISTORY OF GUATFtALA 124-25
(1984) (reporting the increase in union membership and activity following the Second
World War); Compa, supra note 32, at 136 (discussing the relative stability enjoyed
by Guatemalan workers during this period).
104.

See JUAN CARLOS ZARATE, FORGING

DFMOCRACY: A CO.MPARATIvE STUDY

OF THE EFFECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIZATION
57-58 (1994) (discussing the progressive socioeconomic program of President Juan
Jose Arevalo, elected in 1945). Reforms included a comprehensive social security program and labor code, which protected organized labor and helped to raise the standard of living for both the urban and rural laborers. Id. The Labor Code promulgated
in 1947 explicitly recognized unions in the public and private sectors and extended
the right to strike. JAMES A. GOLDSTON, SHATTERED HOPE: GUATEMALAN WORKERS
AND THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 7 (1989).
105. ZARATE, supra note 104, at 55-57. The United States covertly enabled the
overthrow of democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in an effort to secure the
power of the oligarchy. Id. at 56.
106. Id. at 61. One of the consequences of the United States intervention and
backing of the 1954 coup is the loss of the socioeconomic reforms gained under
President Arevalo. Id. Repression of the labor and social movements included numerous assassinations of labor activists. Id; see Compa, supra note 32, at 138 (discussing
the impact of the 1954 coup on the labor movement); STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KwzER, BITTER FRurr. THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 28 (1982) (explaining the decline of the labor movement after the 1954

coup).
107. See Compa, supra note 32, at 145 (discussing the violent repression of labor
in the past four decades); GOLDSTON, supra note 104, at 5-9 (discussing the patterns
of labor suppression in Guatemala).
108. See Compa, supra note 32, at 140 (discussing the non-enforcement of protective labor legislation to bolster the economically privileged at the expense of the labor
force); GOLDSTON, supra note 104, at 147-54 (discussing the lack of protection afforded to the workers and the failure to enforce the labor laws).
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labor movement and chronic social inequities, legacies of the 1954
coup,"° persevered in Guatemala into the 1990s.. as a product of
the export-led economic model that favors foreign investment at the
expense of a more equitable distribution system."' Today, the frequency of mass killings of labor leaders has declined and workers exercise
limited political freedom." 2 Nevertheless, assassinations, violence, and
harassment continue to occur at an alarming rate." 3
Currently, Guatemala is an extremely polarized society, with eighty
percent of the population residing in rural areas."" Of approximately
2.9 million workers in Guatemala, it is estimated that only seven percent
of the working population belong to unions." 5

B. BENEFICIARY STATUS UNDER THE GSP
In the first General Review, conducted in 1986 to 1987 pursuant to
the GSP Renewal Act,"6 the GSP Subcommittee found Guatemala in
compliance with the labor rights provision." 7 For five consecutive
years, from 1987 to 1991, the USTR rejected petitions filed by various

109. See EDELBERTO TORRES-RIVAS, PRESENTATION BY THE PROSECUTOR, GUATEMALA: TYRANNY ON TRIAL 14-15 (1984) (discussing the Guatemalan government's
repression of the labor movement in its establishment of an industrial sector in the
1960s).
110. ZARATE, supra note 104, at 61.
111. Id; see KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 23
(1992) (discussing the government's legislative pursuit of an export-led economic
development strategy, which promotes foreign investment through incentives).
112. GOLDSTON, supra note 104, at 11.
113. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text (describing the Empresa Exacta
incident); Petition Against the Republic of Guatemala, supra note I (documenting continued acts of violence and the persistent repression of union activity); LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ABANDONING THE VICTIMS: THE UN ADVISORY
SERVICES PROGRAM IN GUATEMALA 48 (1990) (reporting that unionists continue to be
the principal victims of death threats, killings, and "disappearances").
114. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 113, at 21.
115. IMCC, LABOR RELATIONS ANALYSIS 8-9 (May 1993) (report submitted to the
United States Agency for International Development).
116. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(2)(A) (1988). The AFL-CIO filed a petition for review
under the General Review of 1987. See 1990 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 102, at 1.
Although the GSP Subcommittee "accepted" the petition for review, it did so under
the congressional mandate of section 2464(c)(2)(A), providing for a General Review.
1990 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 102, at 1.
117. Memorandum of January 2, 1987: Actions Concerning the Generalized System
of Preferences, 52 Fed. Reg. 389 (1987).
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American labor groups requesting review of the labor situation in Guatemala."' The GSP Subcommittee rejected all five requests filed during

the Annual Reviews of 1987 through 1991"' on the basis that the petitions failed to satisfy the informational requirements set forth in the
USTR Regulations."

118. Labor Groups Say They Will Ask USTR to Deny GSP Benefits to Guatemala,
9 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 891 (May 20, 1992). The GSP rejected each
petition notwithstanding detailed allegations of violence confirmed in the United States
Department of State's Human Rights Reports. 1992 Petition, supra note 101, at 3. In
1990 and 1991, the GSP Subcommittee cited the introduction of a labor code reform
bill in the Guatemalan Congress as evidence of "taking steps" toward the recognition
of worker rights. Id. at 6; GENERALZED SYSTEm OF PREFERENCES SuBCo.i OF THE
TRADE PoLICY STAFF COMM., 1991 GSP ANNUAL REVIEW: WORKERs RiGH
REviE i
SUMMdARY, GUATEMALA 7 (OcL 1991) [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL REVIEw]; 1990
ANNUAL REVtNW, supra note 102, at 7-9. Each year, however, the reform bill did not
pass in the Congress. 1992 Petition, supra note 101, at 7-8; see also Compa, supra
note 32, at 151 (discussing the labor law reform bill and its failure to pass in Congress). The GSP Subcommittee also distinguished the assassinations of trade union
activists as human rights violations, refusing to acknowledge the chronic labor rights
abuses. 1992 Petition, supra note 101, at 3.
119. 1990 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 102, at 1. The AFL-CIO filed the first request for review under the Annual Review on June 1, 1987. Id. The International
Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF) filed a petition on June 1,
1988 as part of the 1988 Annual Review. Id. at 2. The United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America filed the 1989 petition. Id. In 1990, Americas Watch
and a group consisting of The Labor and Employment Committee of the National
Lawyers Guild, the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, and the
ILRERF filed separate requests as part of the 1990 Annual Review. Id.
120. 1991 ANNUAL REVmW, supra note 118, at 2. The GSP Subcommittee cites
section 2007.2(a)(2) of the USTR Regulations, which provide in pertinent part:
If a request . . does not conform to the requirements set forth above, or if the
request does not provide sufficient information relevant to subsection 502(b) or
502(c) . . . to warrant review, or if it is clear from available information that
the request does not fall within the criteria of subsection 502(b) or 502(c), the
request shall not be accepted for review.
15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(a)(2) (1995).
In the 1991 GSP Annual Review, the GSP Subcommittee reports its assessment
of the prior five requests:
Specifically, the Subcommittee found in each case that the petitions either
1) provided insufficient information relevant to the statutory provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 2) failed to clearly demonstrate that the information provided fell within the criteria of those same statutory provisions, or
3) failed to present substantial new information warranting further consideration
of the issue.
1991 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 118, at 2.
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In June 1992, the AFL-CIO and ten labor, human rights, and religious
groups filed two separate petitions with the USTR's office requesting
review of Guatemala's labor situation.12 Similar to previous petitions,
the 1992 labor rights petition cited continued violence, death threats, and
intimidation directed at trade union activists, non-enforcement of existing
minimum wage and hours, the widespread use of child labor, and the
inadequacy of the Labor Code in vindicating worker rights.' 2 In August 1992, the GSP Subcommittee accepted the petitions for review of
the labor situation in Guatemala." The Guatemalan Congress responded to the scrutinization of the labor situation and the threatened revocation of GSP benefits by reforming the Labor Code for the first time
in forty years.' 24
1. GSP Leverage Realized in the Political Sphere
Economic leverage of GSP is acutely demonstrated by the events
surrounding Jorge Serrano's coup d'etat on May 25, 1993.'" After
Serrano assumed authoritarian powers, suspending the Congress and the
judiciary, the United States responded swiftly by suspending all aid to
Guatemala and threatening to revoke Guatemala's status as a beneficiary
uhder GSP.' The business community in Guatemala, facing the threat

121.

GENERALIZED SYSTEM

STAFF COMM.,

1993

OF PREFERENCES SUBCOMM.

GSP ANNUAL REVIEW:

WORKER

OF THE TRADE

RIGHTS

POLICY

REVIEW SUMMARY,

GUATEMALA 1 (July, 1994) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REVIEW].
122. Petition/Request For Review of the GSP Status of Guatemala Under GSP
Worker Rights Provisions (June 2, 1992) (on file with The American University Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy).
123. See U.S. May Probe Guatemala Labor Practices, Could Lead to End of
Import Preferences, Int'l. Trade Daily (BNA) (July 9, 1992) (reporting that, according
to United States officials, the petitions would likely be accepted for review because
they were "better written," with increased support from labor groups, and the Government of Guatemala failed to implement promises to reform the labor crisis). If the
GSP Subcommittee found Guatemala in violation of the labor rights provisions of
GSP, its status as a beneficiary developing country would have been terminated in
July 1993. Id.
124. 1993 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 121, at 4.
125. See Compa, supra note 32, at 154 (discussing the GSP review of Guatemala
as a "fortuitous policy instrument" utilized by the United States to influence the restoration of constitutional order in Guatemala).
126. See ZARATE, supra note 104, at 114-15 (reporting that the United States suspended $50 million dollars in aid and threatened to revoke trade benefits under the
GSP). The United States Department of State issued a statement advising that "trade
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences cannot be maintained in a coun-
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of losing over $200 million in trade benefits under the GSP, pressured

Serrano to restore constitutional order.'" The military, which initially
announced support for the self-coup, advised Serrano that they could no
longer support himn due to extreme opposition in the business and civilian sectors. 9 On June 5, 1993, the Guatemalan Congress recon-

vened and elected Ramiro de Leon Carpio, the Attorney General for
Human Rights, as the new president. 3 The United States responded
by restoring
the aid programs and suspending the economic sanc1
tions.

13

2. "Continuing Review" and Deferring Action in 1993
In July, 1993, the GSP Subcommittee issued its determination with
respect to the review of Guatemala initiated in August 1992, extending
the review for six months "to allow the Government of Guatemala time
to effect changes through enforcement of the laws."'" Initially, the

try where labor rights are not respected. Unless democracy is restored in Guatemala,
GSP benefits are likely to be withdrawn." U.S. DEPT. OP STATE, DEPt. OP STATE
DISPATCH (Statement of Richard Boucher, May 27, 1993).
127. President Ousted in Guatemala Amid Celebration, FIN. TiMES, June 2, 1993,
at 7.
128. ZARATE, supra note 104, at 115. On June 1, 1993, Serrano abdicated his
power. Id; see Emily Gurnon, Adios, Jorge; Jorge Serrano Elias, Former President of
Guatemala, 256 THE NATION, No. 25 at 892 (1993) (stating that "[t]here is widespread consensus that this threat was a major factor in the army's decision to devise
a solution acceptable to the United States").
129. ZARATE, supra note 104, at 117. The unprecedented coalition of business
interests, trade unions, and other social groups united with the common goal to force
Serrano to abdicate. Id. Zarate notes that this mobilization of an otherwise dual society "showed that the ideal of democracy provided a common base from which a
disparate population can coalesce and mend a polarized society." Id.
130. See Compa, supra note 32, at 156 (discussing the Serrano self-coup and
subsequent election of Carpio as President of Guatemala); ZARAMTE, supra note 104, at
115 (reporting that the election of Carpio raised hopes both internationally and domestically because of Carpio's former capacity as the Attorney General for Human
Rights).
131. William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup D'etat: Has the Clinton AdministrationPassed the Test?, NoTISUR, July 9, 1993.
132. GENERALZED SYSTEMI OF PREFERENCES (GSP) SUBCO?,NI. OF THE TRADE
POLICY STAFF COM., 1992 GSP ANNUAL REVm v, WORKER RIGrrS REvE
SmMARY, GUATEMALA 1 (July 1993) [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REVIEW]; see also
Kantor Announces Results of 1992 GSP Reviews: Emphasis on Vorker Rights is Underscored, PRESS RELEASE (Office of the United States Trade Representative), June
25, 1993, No. 93-42 (announcing the six-month "continuing review" of Guatemala's

128
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Government of Guatemala addressed high-profile labor disputes to as-

suage any concern that the government espoused a national labor policy
of systematic repression."' For example, when the GSP Subcommittee

expressed concern over a February 19, 1993 decree to implement a ban
on strikes by public employees,"' the Guatemalan Congress quickly
withdrew the decree.' 35 The GSP Subcommittee lauded the enactment
of the Labor Code in late 1992, citing this as an example of administrative reform.3 6 Other positive actions cited include the recognition of

labor situation, during which period Guatemala would remain a beneficiary under
GSP).
At this time, Mickey Kantor expressed a strong commitment to the expedient
resolution of labor rights investigations, stating:
We are committed to vigorously implementing worker rights provisions of the
GSP law, to ensure that countries which benefit from preferential U.S. trade
treatment are making serious efforts to implement international labor norms.
Short periods of review for these countries underscore the Administration's
commitment to worker rights. We do not want to wait a full year before seeing
these countries make progress in this important area.
Kantor Underscores Worker Rights in Announcing 1992 GSP Review Results, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep., No. 26, at 1069 (June 30, 1993).
133. See IMCC, supra note 115, at 8-9 (reporting that the review of labor rights
in Guatemala pursuant to GSP resulted in a "flurry" of remedial actions). To date,
the most prominent actions include: initiatives taken by the Guatemalan Ministry of
Labor to improve the labor inspection program, including the hiring of additional
inspectors and the establishment of new regional inspection bureaus; the expansion of
the labor court system; amendments to the Labor Code in November 1992; the ratification of a Tripartite Agreement between the government, unions, and the private sector, formalized on March 8, 1993; and pledging cooperation to improve labor relations. Id.
134. See 1993 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 121, at 3 (noting that the decree may
be constitutionally overbroad and affect a broader number of public sector workers
than ILO practices contemplate).
135. Stephen R. Coats & Lance A. Compa, Continuing Worker Rights Review:
Guatemala, Testimony presented before the GSP Subcommittee 9 (Nov. 3, 1993)
[hereinafter Testimony]. In their testimony before the USTR, Stephen Coats of U.S.GLEP and Lance Compa of ILRERF noted that "a backward step on worker rights,
followed by a return to the status quo ante, cannot be cited as evidence of progress
on worker rights." (emphasis in original) Id.
136. 1992 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 132, at 2. The GSP Subcommittee noted
with approval the addition of key provisions that directly affect union formation. Id.
These provisions include the following: workers may not be dismissed for participation in union formation; the process of obtaining legal union recognition is simplified;
maximum fines for labor code violations are increased substantially; the judicial process is expedited; and labor courts have increased ability to redress the dismissal of
workers without just cause after negotiations have begun. Id.

19961

WORKER RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA

129

the CAMOSA union at the Phillips Van Heusen maquila factory.'"
The Ministry of Labor authorized the CAMOSA union, which had been

fighting for legal recognition since 1991, several weeks after the GSP
Subcommittee placed Guatemala under review

in August 1992.2

CAMOSA reportedly
has not been recognized by employers for purposes
39
of bargaining.

3. Extension of Continuing Review: 1994 - 1995
In December 1993, the USTR determined once again that Guatemala's

status under GSP should remain under continuing review for an additional six months."' After the six months expired in July 1994, the
GSP Subcommittee again extended review for an additional ninety days,

"to provide the [Government of Guatemala] some additional time to
show that improved enforcement is occurring in practice."' 4 ' The GSP

Subcommittee summarily addressed the issue of continued violence
against unionists, stating that it "noted with regret reports of continuing
acts of violence and threats of violence against trade unionists in
1994. . . [and] it hopes that the GOG [Government of Guatemala] will
take swift action to resolve these issues ... .
The GSP Subcommittee favorably cited the Labor Code enacted in December 1992, noting
"progress made by the Government of Guatemala in the past year to ex-

pand its labor law enforcement mechanisms."'4 3 Despite detailed allega137. 1992 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 132, at 4.
138. Anthony Murawski, Challenging Guatemala's Labor Abuses, MULTINAT'L
MON., May 1993, at 6.
139. Testimony, supra note 135, at 4-5. In addition, three other companies cited
delayed union recognition and bargaining and shut down their plants to avoid unionization. Legal union recognition came after the plant relocated. Id. at 5.
140. Administration Cancels Reviews of Worker Rights in Paraguay, Costa Rica,
Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 29, 1993). Mickey Kantor states that "[wle are
committed to seeing that [the worker rights] provision is strictly enforced," but then
added that "a failure to enact labor legislation that is in compliance with international
standards at the earliest practical opportunity would constitute a serious setback to
these GSP reviews." Id.
141. 1993 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 121, at 7. Mickey Kantor announced that
"in those worker rights cases that we have continued, we want to reiterate our commitment to ensuring that the worker rights standard in the GSP law is met, and our
desire for a quick resolution of outstanding issues." USTR Announces 1993 GSP Review Results: 10 Additional Products Eligible for GSP, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (July
6, 1994).
142. 1993 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 121, at 5.
143. Id.
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tions of serious, systematic violations of each of the specified "internationally recognized worker rights," the GSP Subcommittee did not take
any meaningful action toward Guatemala.
C.

CONTINUING REVIEW: ERODING THE LEVERAGE OF

GSP

The leverage that GSP can exert economically to influence worker
rights erodes as a country is placed on a probationary "continuing review" period wherein the country is "monitored" for improvements in
the labor sector. The mandatory language of the worker rights provisions
of GSP loses legitimacy as an economic sanction when threats to revoke
beneficiary status are illusory.
Economic sanctions can be a powerful instrument'" in securing
compliance with labor standards and as demonstrated by the events of
the coup in 1993, can influence the political climate. Remedial measures
taken by the Government of Guatemala, cited with approval by the GSP
Subcommittee, are superficial and merely employed as evasive tactics to
avoid the threatened trade sanctions and withdrawal of GSP eligibility. 4 These tactics compromise the enforcement value of the GSP program, converting the mandatory language to mere threats. Any appearance of substantive reform in the new Labor Code in 1992 proved
largely cosmetic because the new law suffers from lax enforcement.'"
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE GSP REVIEW
1. Consolidated Review
The establishment of an administrative body to investigate compliance
with internationally recognized worker rights provisions present in all

144. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 12 (1990).
Michael Malloy defines economic sanctions as "coercive economic measures taken
against one or more countries to force a change in policies or at least to demonstrate
a country's opinion about the other's policies." Id.
145. See Compa, supra note 32, at 165 (noting that the Government of Guatemala
quickly resolved longstanding labor disputes and reformed the labor code in an effort
to avoid sanctions).
146. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND
TRADE PRACTICES 375 (1994). The State Department notes that "[t]he greatest obstacle to union organizing and collective bargaining is not the law, but the inability of
the legal system to enforce the law." Id.
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relevant United States trade instruments"' would resolve many of the
tensions under the current statutory scheme." This body should be

distinct from the Office of the USTR in order to de-politicize its findings with respect to a country's labor rights practices." By coordinat-

ing the reviews of all United States trade instruments in one body,
countries that do not recognize worker rights would have their beneficiary status revoked under all applicable trade instruments. This consolidation would unify treatment under the various trade instruments and
would streamline the review process.' The administrative body, or

"Labor Council," shall be responsible for promulgating the regulations
necessary to implement the annual petition procedure and the automatic
review.
2. Annual/Automatic Review
The Labor Council would issue annual reports on the labor practices

of each country receiving preferential treatment under United States
trade legislation. An automatic, annual review of the labor situation in
the developing countries provides several advantages. First, automatic

147. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (listing United States trade instruments that incorporate worker rights conditionality).
148. See Mandel, supra note 24, at 478 (proposing the coordinated enforcement of
GSP, OPIC, and section 301 regimes under a single administrative regime); DoRMAN,
supra note 79, at 16 (suggesting that GSP could be coordinated with other worker
rights policy instruments).
149. The Generalized System of Preferences: In a Rush to Import Trouble?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice and Agric. of the House of
Rep. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1992) (statement of Rep.
Nagle). Representative Nagle accused political agendas of certain personnel arguing
that they interfered with the administration of the GSP program: " . . . the [GSP]
Subcommittee has disregarded certain legal provisions that acknowledge that GSP can
be harmful domestically, override ITC [International Trade Commission] advice, and
set arbitrary decision making standards that are not supported by the law or administrative guidance pertaining to the law." Id; see also Amato, supra note 25, at 116
(concluding that the pattern of dismissing petitions and extending reviews illustrates
"the use of the GSP worker rights provision to sanction politically disfavored countries').
150. But see Zimmerman, OPIC and Worker Rights, supra note 24, at 617 (proposing an OPIC exemption from the worker rights provisions when investors voluntarily agree to comply with worker rights in a particular country).
151. Mandel, supra note 24, at 478-479. Mandel notes that coordination would
foster efficiency, decrease bureaucratic waste, and simplify the review procedure by
providing a single forum. Id. at 478.
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review assures that the labor rights situation in each country is closely
Annual documentation would enable the
monitored and recorded.'
Labor Council to trace the development and progress of labor rights
policies in each beneficiary developing country. Second, the accumulated
information would enable the Labor Council to make informed decisions
about the severity and history of labor rights abuses in a particular
country. Third, an automatic review of all beneficiaries would remove
the stigmatization and political humiliation associated with the review
under the current regulatory scheme.
In addition, the Annual Review procedure implemented by the USTR
Regulations 53 should remain in place, with some modifications. First,
the review process for country eligibility, based on conformance to the
worker rights provision and the intellectual property provision, should be
separate from the review of product eligibility - a complex review procedure with a distinct set of standards, hearings, and issues) 54 Second,
a petition requesting review of a country's labor practices should create
a prima facie case for review, unless the petition is clearly frivolous. 5
Third, the current standard requiring the submission of "substantial new
information," promulgated under the USTR Regulations, should be eliminated. Fourth, the determinations of the USTR should be subject to
judicial review. 56

152. But see DORMAN, GSP EVALUATION, supra note 79, at 6 (stating that an
automatic review procedure would dilute the remedial measures taken by a country
during a review initiated by petition).
153. 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1995); see supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (describing the Annual Review process administered by the GSP Subcommittee).
154. GAO ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 105. The General Accounting Office reports that a review of "[c]ountry practice cases were fundamentally different [from
product eligibility review] in that they involved changes in the internal practices of
another sovereign nation and triggered government-to-government negotiations or representations." Id.
155. See GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 5 (requiring that a petition will be
accepted for review unless the USTR issues a finding that the petition is frivolous).
But see DORMAN, supra note 79, at 15 (proposing that each petition submitted should
be automatically accepted for review). Automatic acceptance of petitions for review of
a country's labor practices leaves the burden of establishing a case on the labor rights
advocates in the United States. By instituting an automatic review of each country
receiving preferential trade treatment under United States legislation, this shifts the
initial burden to the Labor Council to detect labor rights violations.
156. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing the denial of judicial review); see also GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 5 (providing for judicial
review of decisions of the USTR as final agency actions).
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By retaining the Annual Review petitioning, any party can participate
in the dialogue between the USTR, the GSP Subcommittee, and the
Labor Council by filing petitions for review of the labor rights situation
in a beneficiary country. An accepted petition, submitted by labor advocates and interested parties, would trigger an investigation into the labor
practices of the named country. The investigation, conducted by the
Labor Council, would utilize the annual reports, the submitted petition,
the Department of State's Human Rights Reports, and representations of
officials from the country under investigation to determine whether the
country promotes respect for worker rights. These petitions would complement the automatic review conducted by the Labor Council and
would serve as an additional source of information.
A finding of the Labor Council with respect to the recognition or
denial of worker rights would be adopted by the GSP Subcommittee. At
the end of a specified period, the country's status as a beneficiary under
the GSP would be affirmed or revoked. The practice of extending review periods upon the expiration of the previous review period should
be eliminated."s By extending the review period for more than three
years, as is the case with Guatemala,' 8 the threat of imposing economic sanctions becomes diluted. Furthermore, the automatic review would
obviate the need for "continuing review" because the country's labor
rights practices would be assessed annually.
3. Product-Specific Sanctions
To alleviate the tension in imposing the extreme economic sanction of
revoking beneficiary status, the GSP program should allow sector-specific
or product-specific"
suspension of GSP trade benefits.'
Product-based sanctions imposed against a beneficiary country are advantageous in several ways. First, suspending duty-free treatment against

157. But see DORiAN, supra note 79, at 16 (proposing that the continuing review
period should be formally instituted as a probationary period).
158. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text (discussing the continued
review of the labor rights situation in Guatemala since July 1992).
159. See DORMAN, supra note 79, at 15 (recommending that the labor rights provisions should attach to targeted sectors).
160. See Barr, supra note 61, at 42 (proposing the use of product-specific sanctions to reduce the stigma associated with the complete revocation of preferences
under the GSP).
161. See Barr, supra note 61, at 41 (describing the disadvantages of "the blunt
instrument of country removal from trade benefits').
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a product serves the policy goals of the worker rights provision, targeting a specific industry without the political ramifications of the complete
removal of a country from the GSP.' 62 Second, the Labor Council
would be more likely to impose product-based sanctions because they
are less of an overall indictment against the charged country.'63 Third,
companies in the affected sector would have the economic incentive to
redress labor rights abuses themselves and would pressure the government to actively comply with recognizing worker rights.
The Labor Council should be cognizant of the disadvantages posed by
product-specific sanctions. For example, affected industries might feel
unduly targeted. Choosing an appropriate product or sector entails a
sensitive balance between the policies underlying the GSP statute and
the risk of impingement of sovereignty and intrusion into domestic affairs.
4. Composition of the Labor Council
Candidates for membership in the Labor Council should be chosen
from individuals in the legal profession, the judiciary, unions and other
trade affiliations, labor scholars, and representatives of the business
community. The Labor Council should be distinct from the Office of the
USTR and should be closely aligned with the United States Department
of Labor. Council members should be nominated and elected by Congress to serve six-year terms.
5. Advantages
As a permanent institution, the Labor Council would develop expertise
in the evolution of international labor law standards and practices and
the transnationalization of the world economy, becoming intimately
familiar with the labor policy and socioeconomic forces of each country.
By working closely with government and labor officials of beneficiary
countries, the Labor Council would create an open dialogue which
would facilitate the review process.
The establishment of a Labor Council properly places the authority to
investigate labor abuses in a specialized body which is disassociated
from politically and economically inspired bias. Furthermore, the benefi-

162. Id. at 42.
163. Id. at 43.
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ciary countries may cultivate trust in a Labor Council, striving to
achieve economic and social harmonization.
B.

SUBSTANTIVE REFORM

1. Standards and Compliance
The worker rights conditionality should eliminate the ambiguous "tak-

ing steps" language and require complete conformance with "internationally recognized worker rights."'" Furthermore, the list of internationally recognized worker rights should include the principle of non-discrimination." The GSP statute should require that the internationally recognized worker rights are to be construed in accordance with ILO standards and jurisprudence," and should provide distinct guidelines for
interpreting these rights. 67 Application of ILO principles and international standards ensures that the worker rights provision is not applied
arbitrarily.

2. Pursuit of International Consensus
To legitimize the authority of the Labor Council, the United States
must take a number of actions. First, the United States should ratify the

relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations embodying fundamental

164. See GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 3 (proposing that the requirement
should be "whether or not such country is in compliance with internationally recognized worker rights").
165. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of the prohibition against discrimination).
166. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of international standards applied by the GSP Subcommittee in interpreting the scope of worker
rights); see also GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 3 (requiring the USTR to apply
ILO standards and standards relevant to workers in various international human rights
instruments).
167. See GSP Renewal Bill, supra note 23, § 3 (requiring that compliance with
worker rights shall be determined by evaluating: the existing labor laws of a country
and the enforcement of those laws; findings of human rights organizations and the
Department of State's Annual Human Rights Report; provisions in voluntary codes of
conduct and collective bargaining agreements; and the opinions of academics).
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worker rights.6 8 Second, the list of "internationally recognized worker
rights" must be reformulated with valid international consensus.
There are several possible approaches to establishing international
harmonization of worker rights jurisprudence. The United States should
harness the momentum created by the ILO in unifying international
principles of worker rights. The Labor Council could conduct formal
conferences with developing country beneficiaries to achieve international accord on realistic standards. The future establishment of a working
party within the institutional framework of the WTO could contribute
vastly to the task of harmonizing labor standards internationally.
CONCLUSION
Aggrieved workers suffer as a direct result of tariff preferences granted to developing countries under the GSP. GSP currently operates as a
subsidy, allowing developing countries duty-free preferences to promote
their economic development and open their markets so that they can
participate in the globalization of the world economy and reap the benefits of free trade schemes. The United States recognized that this preferential scheme can ultimately be damaging to domestic workers and
industries, luring corporations to relocate abroad where labor is an exploitable commodity. Thus, the United States amended the GSP statutory
scheme to include certain internationally recognized worker rights.
Companies in host beneficiary countries specifically rely upon receiving duty-free tariff treatment for exports into the United States. If the
labor rights clause of the GSP is not stringently enforced, this subsidization increases exploitation of the work force. GSP thus effectively rewards those businesses that operate at the expense of oppressed workers,
by exporting GSP eligible articles into the United States without acknowledging worker rights. It is unconscionable to reward businesses
duty-free treatment, and in turn condemn the laborers to continued repression solely to sustain and promote a developing country's economy.
The comparative advantage of cheap and exploitable labor does not
justify repression on this scale.

168. See Mandel, supra note 24, at 32 (noting that the credibility and persuasiveness of the United States would be heightened if the United States ratified the ILO
Conventions on fundamental rights). Honorable Bernard Sanders defends the United
States failure to ratify ILO Conventions on the basis that the standards elaborated in
the ILO Conventions exist in the United States by virtue of statutes, and extensive
case law. 140 CONG. REC. E1665-01 (1994). This rationale, therefore, suggests that
there is no impetus for the United States to ratify the ILO Conventions. Id.

